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INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers and scientists alike have pursued an 
understanding of the relationship between the operation 
of causal chains and the phenomental perception of 
causality. In one of the earliest systematic investiga-
tions of phenomenal causality, Michette (1929) disputed 
the Humian dictum that we have no direct experience of 
causality and insisted that it was only through observa-
tion of causal relationships that we comprehend our en-
vironment. The causal impression, however is something 
quite other than the mere perception of movements and 
(Popper, 1956). Psychologists have recently become in-
terested in all forms of human cognitions including the 
perception of causality. This paper pursues this inter-
est by investigating the rules an individual perceiver 
uses to understand causal sequences in his environment. 
First, the primary theoretical position of this paper is 
reviewed, then some past attempts to model the human 
judgment process are discussed, finally a direct exper-
imental assault on one aspect of phenomenal causality is 
described along with the different methodological ap-
proaches it necessitates. 
1 
Attribution Theory 
In one of the most influential works in social psy-
chology Heider (1958) describes "common-sense psychology" 
as the manner in which the naive individual interprets 
another's actions and predicts his behavior in future 
situations. Since person perception is assumed to be 
characterized by the same processes as object perception, 
we perceive others' dispositional properties in the same 
way we perceive shape and size as constant attributes of 
objects. ~he perception of these properties in the form 
of motives, sentiments, intentions, wi~hes, and abilities 
enables the perceiver to understand, explain, and predict 
another's behavior:~Just as in the perception of invar-
.L.__-·-
iant characteristics of objects, dispositional properties 
appear immediately self-given; however, they represent a 
selective and constructive process which goes beyond the 
immediate stimulus or visual field. 
( -
\ The central question in this naive analysis of \ __ _ 
action is the attribution of causal influence. In match-
ing causes to events, the perceiver uses the method of 
difference, or as Kelley (197la) states: "an effect is 
attributed to the one of its possible causes with which, 
over time 1 it covar ies. _:)For example 1 in Strickland's 
(1958) study, participants took the role of supervisor 
over two workers for ten work sessions, Worker A was 
monitored during nine of these sessions and Worker B 
2 
3 
was monitored during two. When advised that both workers' 
final output had reached the same high level, supervisors 
judged Worker B more trustworthy than Worker A, even 
though they had observed Worker A's performance to be high 
over more work sessions. In this case, Worker A's output 
(effect) covaried with the supervisor's monitoring behav-
ior (phenomenal cause) and thus was not taken as an indi-
cation of the worker's trustworthiness. Since Worker B 
was monitored only infrequently, his high performance 
(effect) could only be attributed to his trustworthiness 
(cause) . 
One of the primary characteristics of person per-
ception is, however, that the perceiver rarely observes 
the covariation of effect and possible causes over time. 
In such cases, how does the perceiver determine if the 
behavior was intended by the person, evoked by a particu-
lar stimulus in the environment, or was the result of the 
circumstances of the action? Kelley (1967) has distin-
c--
guished ~hree cues which the perceiver utilizes in de-
ciding among possible causes: distinctiveness information, 
the normative quality of the action for the actor; consen-
sus information, the extent to which the action is typical 
of a number of people or just a few; and consistency in-
formation, the frequency with which the action occurs in 
----. 
other situations and/or at other times. J In much the same 
-·-
manner as the scientist critically analyzing his sample 
4 
of data and making estimates of population characteristics, 
the perceiver contrasts the variability between actions 
(distinctiveness) with the variability within actions 
(consistency over people and situations). ~~cArthur (1971) 
, __ 
found that person attributions were made most often with 
low distinctiveness and high consistency information, stim-
ulus attributions were made with high distinctiveness and 
high consistency information, and circumstance attributions 
were made with low consistency information. For example, 
if we observe that Ralph trips over Joan's feet while 
dancing and we know that 
a. Ralph trips over almost every other partner's feet 
(low distinctiveness), 
b. In the past, Ralph has almost always tripped over 
~~a~·~ f~~~ (hi~~ cnnqi~t~nry); 
we will infer that Ralph is a clod (person attribution, 
McArthur, 1971, p. 181). In most situations the attribu-
tion process is not nearly as straightforward. If, in the 
example above, we have the additional information that 
c. Almost everyone else who dances with Joan trips over 
her feet (high consensus), 
we are left with the plausible hypothesis that Joan also 
is a clod (stimulus ~--. attribution~ Kelley (197lb) has dis-
tinguished a number of similar situations in which more 
than one causal factor may be operating. A study by 
Jones, Davis, and Gergen (1961) in which respondents were 
to judge the personality of a job applicant from the tape 
of the job interview provides an example of a multiple 
5 
plausible. causal situation. Recordings were made of ap-
plications for two positions, an astronaut, which required 
an inner-directed, non-social personality and a submarine 
crew member, which required a friendly, obedient, coopera-
tive personality. During the interview the job applicant 
created the impression that he was either friendly and 
sociable or inner-directed and non-social. Respondents 
who listened to tapes of either the inner-directed appli-
cant for the astronaut position or the sociable applicant 
for the submarine crew were confronted with a dilemma. 
The job applicant may have created the impression he did 
because he wanted the job he was applying for (stimulus 
attribution) or because he actually possessed the person-
ality traits he manifested (person attribution). These 
' 
respondents were not confident in their opinions of the 
applicants' personalities. The respondents who listened 
to the tapes of the sociable astronaut applicant or the 
inner-directed submarine crew applicant were presented 
with a much simpler attribution problem. The impression 
created by the applicant could not have been caused by 
his desire for the job, since the impression was directly 
opposite that required for the position. In these cases, 
respondents were quite confident in their judgments that 
the applicant's personality was correctly reflected in 
the impression which he created in the interview. 
6 
Heider suggests that when we attempt to discover the 
dispositional properties which affect another's behavior, 
or when we are operating with only partial information, we 
base our inferences on causal schemata (1958, pp. 80-84). 
While other theorists (Delia & Crockett, 1973; DeSoto & 
Albrect, 1968a, b) have taken the term schema to apply to 
the Gestalt laws of pragnanz which characterize all of 
perception, attribution theorists define a causal schema 
as the conception an individual has of the manner in which 
two or more causal factors interact relative to a partie-
ular effect (Kelley, 197lb). A simila~ definition of ab-
stract structure is given by Feather (1971), "internally 
consistent systems of rules or theories about what ought 
to be the case in the physical and social environment 
[p. 376]." 
A causal schema is a rule which perceivers consis-
tently use when interpreting events in their environments. 
Schemata are assumed to reflect the perceiver's implicit 
theory of causal influence for social situations. Kelley 
(197lb) describes two of the most common of these rules 
as multiple sufficient and multiple necessary causal 
schemata. The first is illustrated by the Jones, Davis, 
and Gergen (1961) study described above and is applied 
in situations where the individual has had the experience 
that different causes can independently produce the same 
effect. Anderson (1974) has described this rule as an 
7 
additive force model: 
A = I + E. (1} 
in which an action A can be obtained if either of the con-
ditions are met. There needs to be some internal force, 
r, indicating that the person wanted to complete the 
action or some external force, E, which compelled the per-
son to engage in the action. From the perceiver's perspec-
tive, either of these forces provide a perfectly acceptable 
explanation for the occurrence of the action, i.e., they 
are functionally similar. Implicit in Statement 1 is the 
reversibility assumption, that not only will the perceiv-
er's predictions about the occurrence of an action follow 
from the additive combination of these two forces, but his 
inferences about the importance of either of the forces 
will also be made from the additive combination of the 
intensity of the action and the value of the other force. 
In the example cited above (Jones, et al., 1961), -the in-
ternal force would be the job applicant's personality, the 
external force the role demands of the position applied 
for, and the action the behavior of the applicant pre-
sented on the tape of the interview. Reversing Statement 
1, perceivers inferred the presence of internal force when 
the external force and the action had opposite values (e.g., 
when the applicant for the astronaut position carne across 
as extroverted and cooperative). In multiple sufficient 
causal schemata, individual components are assumed to be 
functionally equivalent in relation to the outcome, dif-
fering not qualitatively but quantitatively. 
8 
A multiple necessary causal schema will be evidenced 
in situations where the perceiver has had the experience 
that several causes must be present at the ~ time for 
an event to occur. Causes are assumed to vary both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively. Anderson (1971} describes this 
rule as a multiplying model typical of much of human judg-
ment. For example, there is evidence that the overall 
effectiveness of a communication for producing attitude 
change is the product of the credibility of the source 
and the position advocated by the message (McKillip, 1974b; 
McKillip & Edwards, 1974}. If the value of either of these 
parameters is low, the resultant communication effective-
ness will also be low. These parameters differ qualita-
tively since no amount of source credibility can compensate 
for message extremity. A multiple necessary causal schema 
implies that an outcome will be dependent on the multipli-
cation (interaction} of the values of the causes and not 
simply their additive (linear} combination. 
should also be reversible. 
Such rules 
In summary, attribution theory predicts that the 
perceiver uses certain rules, causal schemata, when con-
fronted with a problem of causal ascription. Although 
these rules may take different forms, their application 
is to be consistent and reversible. 
Naive Analysis of Action 
The central causal schema in Heider's {1958) common 
sense psychology concerns the constituents of an action 
sequence which lead the perceiver to know what another is 
trying to do, intends to do, or has the ability to do. 
An action is perceived to be the result of both personal 
and environmental forces. Effective personal force is 
composed of such dispositional properties as motivation, 
ability, and personality; effective environmental force 
is the result of environmental constraints, opportunity, 
and luck. Weiner {Freize & Weiner, 1971; Weiner, Heck-
hausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972) has suggested the two way 
classification of these factors contained in Table 1. 
Heider (1958, pp. 86-87) suggests that stable internal 
and stable external factors form a multiple sufficient 
causal schema for judgments of those actions which an-
other can accomplish: 
Can = Ability + Environmental Facility. {2) 
A person can accomplish an action if he has high ability 
or if the task is easy. This dispositional property re-
sults when the imposed restraining forces are less than 
the individual's power to act. Heider further speculates 
9 
an individual's motivational and Can properties form a 
multiple necessary causal schema for judgments of possible 
degrees of success: 
Outcome Motivation X Can, ( 3) 
Table 1 
Classification of Dispositional Properties 
stability 
Stable 
variable 
Locus of Control 
Internal 
Ability 
Personality 
Motivation 
Exertion 
10 
External 
Task Demands 
Environmental Facility 
Luck 
Opportunity 
11 
and in combina~ion with Statement 2 
outcome= ~otivation (Ability+ Environmental Facility). 
( 4) 
The perceiver ~s assumed to predict another's outcome from 
the perceived ~otivation of the other to succeed (inten-
tions, exertioo) and his interpretation of the capabilities 
of the other (Can) in a configura! manner such that differ-
ences in the p~edicted outcome due to the level of motiva-
tion will be g~eater when the person judged is of high 
rather than lo~ capability. The implications of Statement 
4 are that abi~ity and environmental facility will not in-
teract but wil~ combine linearly in the naive analysis of 
action. Motiv~tion on the other hand, will combine con-
be inferred from the configura! interpretation of his out-
come and capab~lities: 
Motivation = Outcome 
Can 
( 5) 
The dist~nctions which Heider draws between dispo-
sitional properties are important for the manner in which 
each is hypothesized to influence the naive analysis of 
action. While capability represents the perception of a 
"relatively stable relationship" between person and envi-
ronment, motivation, including both intention and exer-
tion, can vary independently of the environment and is 
central to the perception of personal causality and indi-
vidual responsLbility. Since an individual's capabilities 
are assu~ed to be constant for every attempt at a given 
task, variations in outcome are attributed to the ener-
gizing disposition of motivation. Heider predicts that 
personal responsibility for an outcome will be directly 
related to motivation rather than to ability. 
Freize and Weiner (1971) found that internal at-
tributions of causality (ability, effort) both increased 
as the distinctiveness of success increased (fewer suc-
cessful others) and that for such cases effort attribu-
12 
tions were higher than ability attributions. Feather and 
Simon (1971) found effort rather than ability attributions 
when participants expected failure but experienced success. 
Weiner and Kukla (1970) and Zander, Fuller, and Armstrong 
(1972) found greatest pride in success and least shame for 
failure when individuals perceived themselves to have low 
ability but high motivation. Similarly the least pride in 
success and the most shame for failure was experienced by 
individuals of high ability and low motivation. Assuming 
that pride in success and shame for failure are measures 
of perceived personal responsibility, these studies sup-
port the qualitative distinction between motivation and 
capability. Finally, Schmidt (1964) presented respondents 
with situations in which an individual did or did not have 
the ability and motivation to meet his responsibilities. 
Participants invoked moral obligations when the individ-
uals lacked the motivation to meet his responsibilities 
regardle~s of his abilities. 
Differences between multiple sufficient (Statement 
2 ) and multiple necessary causal schemata (Statement 3) 
are important both mathematically and psychologically. 
The first suggests a linear or additive strategy of cue 
combination. For studies of judgment which utilize fac-
13 
torial cue combination, in an analysis of variance design 
this schema reduces to a significant main effect for each 
cue with no interactions (Anderson, 1970; Hoffman, Slavic, 
& Rorer, 1968) . Psychologically this schema suggests 
functional equivalence for cues. A multiple necessary 
schema suggests a configura!, specifically multiplying, 
strategy of cue combination. Analysis of judgments from 
factorial cue combinations should yield a significant cue 
interaction characterized wholly by the bilinear component. 
Psychologically, multiplying suggests dynamic as compared 
to static relationships and qualitative differences be-
tween cues. 
Analysis of Statement 5 yields three hypotheses: 
(a) holding ability level constant, judgments of motiva-
tion will be a positive function of the extremity of the 
outcome cue; (b) holding outcomes constant, judgments will 
be an inverse function of the extremity of the ability cue; 
and (c) in a design which combines ability and outcome cues 
factorially, motivation judgments should yield a significant 
cue interaction characterized by the bilinear component. 
14 
Le~enthal and Michaels (1971) had participants judge 
the deservingness of reward of the high jump performance 
(a measure assumed to reflect personal responsibility and 
perceived motivation) for individuals differing in ability, 
training (both internal stable properties), and effort. 
High jump performance was perceived as more deserving for 
(a) high as compared to low effort; (b) low as compared to 
high ability; and (c) relevant as compared to irrelevant 
training, supporting the first two hypotheses outlined 
above. While the Outcome X Training interaction was sig-
nificant, the Outcome X Ability interaction was not. Kepka 
and Brickman (1971) had participants judge the motivation 
of students from their granes (ontcomP. r.uP.) and SAT scorP.s 
(ability cue) and found that perceived motivation increased 
with outcome, decreased with ability and yielded a signif-
icant Outcome X Ability interaction. While the first two 
hypotheses again received support, evidence for the third 
was equivocal. Inspection of the cue interaction for both 
these studies indicates that the bilinear component would 
not have been significant. Anderson and Butzin (in press) 
present the clearest test of this third hypothesis along 
with an assessment of the reversibility of the causal schema. 
Participants made judgments of motivation from outcome and 
ability cues for applicants for graduate school and a col-
lege track team. For both judgments the critical Outcome 
X Ability interaction was significant and characterized by 
,II,! 
!'! 
1: 
the bilinear component (81% of the interaction variance 
for judgments of athletes and 75% of this variation for 
15 
judgments of graduate applicants). However, when partie-
ipants made judgments of outcome from ability and motiva-
tion cues or judgm~nts of ability from outcome and moti-
vation cues, cue interactions were not found, violating 
the reversibility assumption. 
In summary, there is good general support for both 
the qualitative differences between the dispositional 
properties of motivation and capability and the functional 
relationship betwe~n cues and judgment suggested by Heider's 
naive analysis of action. However, research has not pro-
vided unanimous support for the exact causal schema which 
Heider suggested either in consistency or reversibility 
of application. 
Paramorphic Representation of Judgment 
At~ribution theorists are by no means alone in their 
interest in the rules used for combination of information 
in decision making. A number of researchers have attempted 
to model judgment policies by analyzing the correlations 
between cue values and final judgments with multiple re-
gression equations. Hoffman (1960) borrowed the term 
"paramorphic'' from mineralogy for the resulting mathemati-
cal models since in much the same way that two crystals 
may have identical chemical structures but different 
molecula~ structures, the 
. mathematical description of judgment 
is inevitably incomplete, for there are 
other properties of judgment still unde-
scribed, and it is not known how accurately 
the underlying process has been represented 
[p. 125]. 
16 
A mathematical model may yield results which parallel the 
actual judgments of an individual, however, this model 
does not necessarily represent the actual process of judg-
ment utilized by the judge. While a large amount of the 
work in this paradigm has been done simply to aid the pro-
fessional in understanding aspects of his own judgment 
policies (Goldberg, 1970), a topic of great theoretical 
interest had been the inclusion of non-linear terms in 
the resultant mathematical models of the judgment process. 
This question is directly related to the inclusion of con-
figural terms in causal schemata. 
Wiggins and Hoffman (1968) constructed models for 
the combination of 11 MMPI scales (cues) in the clinical 
prediction of "psychotic" or "neurotic" for each of 29 
judges. A least squares fit of cue values to the judgments 
was determined for three derivation samples and cross-val-
idated on four smaller samples. Cues for the linear model 
were simply the scores on the 11 MMPI scales. A second, 
quadratic model included these cues plus their squares and 
cross products. A third, sign model was also tested but 
is not directly relevant to the present research. The 
:I 
,1: ,, 
,:l,i 
average multiple correlation between judgments predicted 
bY the models and the judgments obtained from the cross 
validated samples was taken as an indication of the ade-
quacy of the model. The quadratic model was superior to 
the linear model for only 9 of the 29 judges and the in-
crease in correlation for the most non-linear judge was 
only .04. Studies similar to this one have generally 
found that linear models of cue combination account for 
nearly all the reliable judgment variation (Goldberg, 
1968; Slavic & Lichtenstein, 1971). 
The conclusion that judges uniformly utilize an 
additive strategy for cue combination is unwarranted, 
however, on three grounds. First, consistent non-linear 
cue usage has been demonstrated using this correlational 
17 
methodology (Slavic, 1966). Secondly, it has been demon-
strated that participants can learn to use cues in a con-
figural manner although not as quickly as cues linearly 
related to a criterion (Hammon & Summers, 1965; Knowles, 
Hammond, Stewart, & Summers, 1971). Finally many of the 
studies have relied on the standard multiple regression 
equation to determine the goodness of fit for the linear 
model, a test for which this statistic is inadequate 
(Birnbaum, 1973). Anderson and others (Anderson, 1972; 
Hoffman, et ~-~ 1968) have noted that in designs using 
factorial cue combination, analysis of variance provides 
a powerful test of goodness of fit for both linear and 
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non-linear models. Generally, linearity would be reflected 
in significant main effects for a design with zero inter-
actions. Configura! judgment strategies would be reflected 
by certain significant components of the interaction terms. 
slovic (1965) was able to demonstrate significant config-
ural cue components for models of two stockbrokers' deci-
sions to buy or sell stocks in imaginary companies with 
the analysis of variance methodology. Further, these cue 
combinations were interpretable in terms of the stock-
brokers' own theoretical orientations. Similarly, config-
ural cue utilization was exhibited for malignancy predic-
tions from stomach ulcer characteristics by nine radial-
ogists (Hoffman, et al., 1968). Sidnowski and Anderson 
(1967) have shown that even when the correlation between 
judgments and a linear combination of cues is as high as 
.98, interactions that are significant both statistically 
and psychologically can be detected by the use of analysis 
of variance. The support generally found for linear models 
of cue combination may thus be more a reflection of re-
search methodology than underlying judgment principles. 
Another important result of attempts to model human 
judgment processes has been the low consistency between 
expert judges. In the Hoffman, et ~· (1968) study, radial-
ogists judgments of malignancy were factor analyzed in or-
der to discover groupings of judges by judgment strategies. 
Four factors emerged, although the authors report "it 
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remains to be discovered exactly what distinguishes these 
f . d [p. 345]." types o J u ges In this study the overall me-
dian inter-judge correlation was only • 38. Wiggins, Hoff-
man, and Taber (1960) report on judgments of intelligence 
made by 145 adults from 199 profiles containing 9 cues. 
Factor analysis of these judgments uncovered 8 subject 
factors reflecting quite different judgment strategies. 
wiggins (1973) argues that these factors reflect "char-
acteristic styles in which individuals perceive, construe, 
and organize their environment [p. 173] ." 
Whether or nut these subject factors directly re-
fleet different integration strategies is not as important 
as the wide range of individual differences in cue utiliza-
tion which they suggest. 
Present Research 
Two implications of the research reviewed are impor-
tant for the present investigations of phenomenal causal-
ity. While attribution theory assumes that causal schemata 
are used to aid in assigning causal influence and that 
these rules possess the property of reversibility, para-
morphic judgment studies have found that integration stra-
tegies differ widely between individuals. The implication 
of Anderson and Butzin's (in press) failure to support the 
use of a multiple necessary causal schemata for two of the 
three judgment tasks may not be that such rules were not 
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used but rather that the analysis of aggregate data dis-
guised different individual judgment rules. A number of 
recent studies of judgment strategies provided evidence 
that individuals use different combination rules for the 
same judgment task (Karabeniek, 1972; Shanteau & Anderson, 
1972; Wallsten, 1972). In the Shanteau and Anderson (1972) 
study, while aggregate data provided support for a three 
variable multiplying model for judgments of the worth of 
an added piece of information in a simple decision task, 
analysis of individual participants' judgments revealed 
support for at least three additional compound adding-
multiplying models. 
The present study examined the implications of the 
research reviewed for the perception of causality in gen-
eral and the use of causal schemata in particular. Most 
investigations of the use of judgment rules within the 
attributional framework have provided only qualitative 
tests of their use. However, the existence and results 
of the use of this type of cognitive albegra need to be 
demonstrated more rigorously if causal schemata are to be 
taken as representations of the naive analysis of action 
(Anderson, 1974). Analysis of judgments of other's actions 
were expected to reveal consistent relationships to dispo-
sitional property cues (Hypothesis 1). Specifically, judg-
ments of possible outcomes will be positively related to 
the cues of ability, environmental facility, and motivation. 
In addit~on, judgments of ability will be positively re-
lated to outcome and negatively related to environmental 
facility and motivation. 
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Not only will judges use cues consistently, but the 
causal schemata will be more complex than a simple linear 
combination of cue values, involving cue interactions. 
Individual causal schema were expected to evidence signif-
icant configura! cue components generally paralleling 
Heider's (1958) formulations (Hypothesis 2). The config-
urality will tend to take the form suggested by Statement 
4. Mathematically, motivational cues 3hould be shown to 
stand in a multiplicative relationship to both ability 
and environmental facility cues for judgments of outcome. 
Psychologically, in terms of Table 1, judges should first 
assess the stable dispositional properties of ability and 
environmental facility and then qualify this assessment 
by the amount of effort the individual will extend to re-
alize the outcome (internal variable disposition). Ander-
son (1973, personal communcation) has suggested an alter-
native causal schema for this judgment task: 
Outcome = (Ability X Motivation) + Environment Facility, 
(6) 
where the motivation cue multiples only the ability cue. 
Psychologically, judges should first assess the effect of 
the internal causal dispositions and combine this assess-
ment with the influence of external factors. While the 
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two schemata seem quite similar, they suggest different 
psychological processes and can be differentiated statis-
tically. 
The test of this second hypothesis will be provided 
by the presence or absence of significant bilinear compo-
nents·for the three, two-way interactions of the ability, 
the environmental facility and the motivation cues. Both 
statements 4 and 6 suggest an Ability X Motivation inter-
action for which differences in outcome judgments due to 
the motivation cues will be greater at high as compared 
to low ability levels and that the highest outcomes will 
be predicted for the high ability, high motivation cue 
combination. Statement 4 suggests a similar Environmental 
Facility X Motivation interaction while Statement 6 sug-
gests that the effect of the motivation cue will be inde-
pendent of the level of environmental facility. Both for-
mulations suggest that differences in outcome judgments 
due to ability cues will be independent of the level of 
environmental facility. 
Individual causal schemata for judgments of outcome 
from the cues of ability, environmental facility and moti-
vation should be algebraically similar to judgments of 
ability from the cues of outcome, environmental facility 
and exertion (past motivation). An individual's causal 
schema was expected to be reversible for judgments within 
the same general framework (Hypothesis 3). Reversing 
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statemen~ 4 for judgments of ability yields: 
Ability = (Outcome/Motivation) - Environmental 
Facility, (7) 
where judgments of ability are the result of the division 
of outcome cue values by motivation cue values combined 
with the environmental facility cue. A similar reversal 
of statement 6 yields: 
Ability = (Outcome - Environmental Facility)/Motivation, 
( 8) 
where judgments of ability are the result of the combina-
tion of the outcome and environmental facility cues di-
vided by the motivation cue value. 
As a test of this hypothesis, Statements 7 and 8 
predict an Outcome X Motivation interaction of the form 
that differences in judged ability due to motivation level 
are greater at high as compared to low outcome levels and 
that the highest ability judgments are made for the low 
motivation, high outcome cue combination. Statement 8 
predicts that the Environmental Facility X Motivation in-
teraction will take the form that differences due to moti-
vation will be greater for low as compared to high environ-
mental facility and that the highest ability judgments will 
be made for the low environmental facility, low motivation 
cue combination. While this interaction is not predicted 
by Statement 7, Heider (1958, p. 111) does discuss a simi-
lar interaction for judgments of ability. Both Statements 
7 and 8 anticipate that judgments of ability from outcome 
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cues wil~ be independent of the level of environmental 
facility. 
Hypotheses 1-3 allow for differences in individual 
strategies for cue utilization but give no clue for under-
standing these differences. Within the attributional lit-
erature, two individual difference measures have been sug-
gested to account for differences in cue usage. Kukla 
(1972) found high achievement oriented respondents were 
more sensitive to effort requirements for performance than 
were low achievement oriented respondents. Presumably, 
differential perception of this crucial variable will be 
reflected in attributional strategies manifest in the judg-
ment tasks outlined. Karabenick (1972) demonstrated dif-
fering perceptions of the valence of success and failure 
for respondents varying on internal-external locus of con-
trol (Rotter, 1966). Internal respondents gave more extreme 
evaluations of both success and failure than did externals. 
Weiner, et ~- (1972) criticize the use of this personality 
dimension for failure to take into account the stable-
variable dimension of causal attribution, as described in 
Table 1. McKillip (1974a) has developed a measure which 
attempts to differentiate respondents according to their 
use of internal-external and stable-variable causal expla-
nations which should be related to different rules for cue 
combination. In addition, intelligence may be an individ-
ual difference variable related to the tendency to use 
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configur~l cues in forming judgments. Previous published 
research has not included an intelligence measure. Indi-
vidual differences in causal schemata were also expected 
to be related to the personality dimensions of achievement 
motivation and causal attributions (Hypothesis 4). 
In summary, the present study examined group and in-
dividual patterns of causal attributions to evaluate the 
use of causal schemata and the relationship between dif-
ferent judgmental strategies and cognitive styles. 
Method of Analysis 
Anderson's functional measurement (1970) provided 
the primary method of assessment in the present study. 
functional measurement provides two tests for the use of 
causal schemata, one graphic and the other statistical. 
Graphically, the use of multiplicative terms is evidenced 
by sets of (here, four) diverging straight lines; statis-
tically, two cue interactions should be characterized 
wholly by the bilinear component. Simple additive combi-
nation, in contrast, should yield four parallel straight 
lines and only significant cue main effects. Use of 
Statement 4, for example, is supported by significant !' 
Ability X Motivation and Environmental Facility X Moti-
vation interactions characterized wholly by the bilinear 
components with nonsignificant Ability X Environmental 
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Facility.and Ability X Environmental Facility X Motivation 
interaction terms. Significant residual components for 
anY interaction terms suggest non-interval response or 
stimulus scales. If this is the case, a monotone trans-
formation of the judgment data should be available to 
eliminate this source of variation. Non-significance 
for the bilinear components of the first two interactions 
terms mentioned above or significant components for the 
second two terms suggest the use of a causal schema dif-
ferent from Statement 4. Use of Statement 6 is supported 
by a significant bilinear component for the Ability X 
Motivation interaction only. Similar requirements must 
be met for the use of Statements 7 or 8. Reversibility 
of causal schemata is supported by the utilization of 
algebraically similar judgment rules for both of the 
judgment tasks. Recent papers by Leon, Oden and Anderson 
(1973) and Shanteau and Anderson (1972) provide examples 
of the use of functional measurement to study modes of 
information integration. 
METHOD 
Respondents participated in five experimental ses-
sions, one group session in which individual difference 
measures were administered and four individual judgment 
sessions. During the first two of these individual ses-
sions, participants made judgments of outcome from the 
cues of motivation, ability and environmental facility. 
During the final two sessions, participants made judgments 
of ability from the cues of motivation, outcome and envi-
ronmental facility. The judgment cues of motivation, 
ability, outcome and environmental facility were opera-
tionalized as study habits, IO, qrade ooint averaqe (GPA) 
and course load, respectively. Both outcome and ability 
judgments were made by drawing a perpendicular to a point 
along the 6 inch judgment scale graded in 1.5 inch seg-
ments. 
Participants 
Twenty-nine introductory psychology students from 
Loyola University volunteered to fulfill part of a course 
requirement. The 19 male and 10 female participants ranged 
in age from 17 to 22 years with a median of 18 years. The 
sample included 6 (21%) minority group members. 
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Judgment Tasks 
-
Judgments of outcomes were predictions of the first 
semester GPA for a stimulus person from knowledge of his 
ability, environmental facility, and motivation. Ability 
was operationalized as IQ, environmental facility as course 
load for first semester, and motivation as a three trait 
personality description indicating study habits. Four 
levels for each cue were identified and labelled, as in-
dicated in:~ppendix A. In discussion these cue levels 
will be denoted as L, M-, M+, and H ranging from low to 
high. Identifications for cue levels presented in Appen-
dix A were the result of extensive pretesting in an at-
tempt to attain equal spacing between cue levels. The 
task consisted of participants reading aloud the levels 
of the three cues of each stimulus person and indicating 
their judgment of the first semester GPA. 
Judgments of ability were inferences of the intelli-
gence of a stimulus person from knowledge of his outcome, 
environmental facility, and motivation. Outcome has oper-
ationalized as first semester GPA, environmental facility 
as first semester course load, and motivation as relative 
amount of study during the first semester. The four levels 
of each judgment cue identified and labelled are presented 1,,, 
in Appendix A. The ability judgment task was identical to 
that for outcome judgment except that the dependent measure 
was inferred ability. 
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Judgments of outcome and ability were made on simi-
lar 6 inch scales labelled at 1.5 inch intervals. For 
outcome judgments, labels indicated possible grade point 
averages from 0.0 to 4.0 in steps of 1.0. For ability 
judgments, labels indicated degree of ability from 0 for 
very low ability to 4 for very high ability in steps of 
1. The principle dependent measure was the distance to 
the nearest 1/32 of an inch from the zero point of the 
scale to the perpendicular drawn to indicate the judgment. 
scores could range from 0.0 to 6.0. 
Procedure 
Each participant completed five experimental ses-
sions within a oeriod of ~igh~ ~~YA-
session, a group of from 5 to 8 participants completed 
the following individual difference measures: (a) intel-
ligence, Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Abilities Test (Otis, 
1939); (b) a measure of resultant achievement motivation, 
Mehrabian's Achievement Risk Preference Scale (Mehrabian, 
1969); and (c) the Causal Perceptions Questionnaire 
(McKillip, 1974a) which contains subscales for internal-
external and stable-variable causal assignment. 
During the judgment sessions, judgment cues and 
their relationship to the task dimension were explained. 
These relationships were displayed before participants 
during the entire session. Next, participants were 
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instructed in the use of the response scale and a number 
of single cue judgments were made to insure familiarity 
with the scale. Finally the experimental task was ex-
plained. For each stimulus person, levels for the three 
cues were printed on single 5 inch by 8 inch cards. Par-
ticipants read the cues aloud and made their judgments 
in an answer booklet containing one scale per page. Pre-
sentation of judgment cases was self paced with the re-
striction that the maximum interval between judgments was 
20 seconds and the minimum 10 seconds. Order of presenta-
tion was randomized by shuffling the deck of stimulus cases 
before each experimental session. During each session, 
participants made judgments of one complete replication 
of the design (64 cases) preceded by 16 anchor and prac-
tice trials. During the first two individual sessions, 
participants made judgments of outcomes, and during the 
final two sessions, they made judgments of ability. 
Data Analysis and Design 
Each judgment task yielded 128 judgments per partie-
ipant with two replications and factorial combination of 
each of four levels of three cues. These data were anal-
yzed by analysis of variance and causal schemata were con-
structed for each participant for each judgment task by 
the techniques of functional measurement. Finally, the 
use of particular causal schemata was related to the in-
dividual difference measures. 
RESULTS 
outcome Judgments: Aggregate Analysis 
The results of a repeated measures analysis of 
variance with the three judgments cues, ability, envi-
ronmental facility, and motivation, treated as fixed 
factors and replications (2) and participants (29) 
treated as random factors are presented in Table 2. 
Fixed factor effects and their interactions are tested 
against a pooled error term. In addition to F values, 
Table 2 contains the percentage of variance estimates, 
w2 (Vaughn & Corballis, 1969) . 
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of Ability, Environmental Facility and Motivation are 
significant and account for approximately 50% of the 
total variance. Mean outcome judgments for each level 
of these three cues are presented in Table 3. It is 
apparent from this table that the equal spacing assump-
tion for cue levels was not met. Therefore, weights 
for trend analysis of interaction terms were determined 
from these marginal means (Grandage, 1958). Table 2 
also reveals that none of the two-way interactions were 
significant. The means for these interactions are pre-
sented in Figures 1-3. The self-spacing along the 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance for Outcome Judgment Scores 
source MS df F 
Subjects 11.99 28 .066 
Replications .01 1 .000 
* Ability (A) 439.09 3 808.64 .255 
Environmental 
* Facility (B) 79.47 3 146.35 .049 
* Motivation (c) 328.42 3 604.82 .202 
A X B .43 9 .79 .000 
A X c .74 9 1. 38 .000 
B X c .46 9 .85 .000 
A X B X c .34 27 . 63 .000 
Polled 
Error .54 3619 
'!I 
' 
*p < . 01 
I, 
1fl. 
'!!'!, 
·!lli;l 
Iii ,.1, 
i:ill 
'1,' 
'I 
!; 
i,l 
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Table 3 
Outcome Judgment Means for Cue Main Effects 
Level 
cue 
L M- M+ H 
Ability 2.87 3.11 4.00 4.30 
Environmental 
Facility 3.19 3.53 3.67 3.88 
Motivation 2.94 3.20 3.93 4.20 
Note.- Means can range from 0.0 to 6.0, the higher the 
~e~~ ~h~ h!;h~r Lhe PL~~i~L~~ vu~~0llic ~GPA~. 
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abscissa was derived from the marginal means {Table 3). 
The parallelism portrayed in each of these figures sug-
gests additive rather than multiplicative cue combination. 
Analysis of aggregate data suggested that participants 
used a multiple sufficient causal schema of the form: 
Outcome = Ability + Environmental Facility 
+ Motivation, { 9) 
where outcome judgments increased with increases in any 
of the three cues but that the effect of any one cue was 
independent of the level of either of the other two cues. 
This analysis supports a simple linear model rather than 
the more complex configura! models of Statements 4 and 6. 
n.""~l-u·~;C! 
-----~- -... --
A repeated measures analysis of variance of outcome 
judgments was performed for each participant with repli-
cations treated as a random factor. In addition both the 
bilinear trend and the residual component of each of the 
two-way interactions was tested. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 4 with participants grouped 
to aid discussion. Percentage of variance estimates for 
all analysis terms are presented in Appendix B. 
Main effects. For all participants the Ability and 
Motivation main effects were significant and for all but 
two (7 and 8) the Environmental Facility main effect was 
significant. In all cases except one, outcome judgments 
I 
'! 
i ' ~ 
'I 
Table 4 
~ Ratios for Model Analysis, Outcome Judgments 
participants Main Effects 
with only Ability Environmental Motivation 
Main Effects (A) Facility (B) (c) 
1 101 11 108 
2 20 28 22 
3 56 19 32 
4 68 12 108 
5 45 56 36 
6 141 15 121 
7 335 .25 93 
8 14 2.06 4 
''1, II 
Participants :1 :li I I 
with signif-
li' icant inter-
actions 'I 
9 90 86 61 
1.0 46 n --.., .J I 
11 69 10 89 
12 55 15 110 
13 283 46 332 
14 79 16 59 
15 24 28 73 
16 47 15 46 
17 78 8 22 
18* 51 15 38 
19 13 2 16 47 
20 107 7 83 
21 199 10 69 
22 85 8 13 
23 131 13 77 
24 99 37 66 
25 57 26 144 
Participants 
with sign if-
icant residuals 
26 27 399 62 
27 99 7 104 
28 105 40 78 
29 204 13 167 
df 3/63 3/63 3/63 
Note: Significant and nonsignificant Fs given to 0 and 2 
decimal places, respectively. 
* Squareroot transformation 
Table 4 (Continued) 
F Ratios for Model Analysis, Outcome Judgments 
participants 
with only 
Main Effects 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Participants 
with signif-
icant inter-
actions 
9 
, n 
- ,_, 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18* 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Participants 
with signif-
icant residuals 
26 
27 
28 
29 
df 
A X B 
.11 
.17 
1.94 
3.14 
2.96 
.03 
1. 69 
.09 
7 
s 
4 
11 
10 
4 
4 
5 
. 0 0 
.78 
.37 
.66 
.95 
5 
.57 
.63 
• 04 
.oo 
3.75 
.01 
1. 58 
1/63 
Bilinear Interactions 
A X c B X c 
1. 09 1.87 
.80 .52 
1.89 3.38 
.37 .83 
2.04 . 0 0 
.71 3.14 
1. 49 .00 
.06 2.46 
24 20 
... ~ 
I ..J 
4 6 
12 9 
21 .09 
19 1.02 
7 1.31 
5 2.53 
11 .56 
5 1.17 
9 • 24 
11 1. 22 
8 1. 53 
.07 .57 
5 5 
.40 9 
2.69 4 
. 53 .49 
2.43 .07 
.02 . 11 
11 3.48 
1/63 1/63 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
F Ratios for Model Analysis, Outcome Judgments 
participants Residual Interactions Three-Way Inter-
with only action 
Main Effects A X B A X c B X c A X B X c 
1 .71 .94 .88 1. 04 
2 1.60 .92 .26 • 58 
3 .26 . 91 .27 .67 
4 1.42 .83 .41 .64 
5 1.12 .41 .65 1.13 
6 1. 20 .38 1. 92 .81 
7 .66 .28 .54 .99 
8 • 58 .49 .78 1. 29 
Participants ,:1 I 
with sign if-
icant inter-
actions 
9 .72 .79 .79 1.62 
~ ~ 
-- .3~ .99 .60 ... ..; . .:;, .;) 
11 2.00 .87 .66 1. 09 
12 .48 .57 .19 .38 
13 1. 98 1. 69 1. 53 .79 
14 .48 1.06 .54 .94 
15 1.20 .84 1. 02 1. 40 
16 .18 .33 1.01 .75 
17 .89 .88 .34 .76 
18* 1.81 1.18 1.33 1.28 
19 1.13 .46 . 51 . 98 II 20 1. 34 .67 .51 .50 
'I '''il 21 1.89 .70 2.08 .97 I''' I 
22 .46 .51 .42 .43 ill'l 
23 1. 80 .24 .52 .50 1!':'' 
I Iii 24 1.06 • 63 .31 .88 
II 
25 .89 1. 62 .01 1. 53 
,jl 
1',', 
Participants '!,'.: 1:, 
with signif- ,,~:r 1!, 
icant residuals 1''1' 1.1!, 
26 3 1. 24 3 2 li,:j 
27 3 . 58 2 .94 ji! 
'I' 
28 3 1.42 2 1.24 r 
29 . 97 2 . 50 1. 46 
df 8/63 8/63 8/63 27/63 
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increase~ as cue levels increased, in a pattern similar 
to that of Table 3. Participant 22 seemed to have re-
versed the ordering of environmental facility cues since 
he predicted higher outcomes (GPA) for lower environmental 
facility (heavier course loads). On the average the Abil-
ity, Environmental Facility and Motivation main effects 
accounted for 37.5, 11.1, and 29.4% of the outcome var-
iance, respectively. 
According to functional measurement theory, a sig-
nificant bilinear interaction component and a nonsignif-
icant residual component provide support for the use of 
a multiplicative judgment term. A significant residual 
interaction component may indicate an invalid model (mul-
tiplicative term) or may simply reflect non-interval 
scaling properties. In the latter case a monotonic trans-
formation may be found which causes the residual interac-
tion to disappear. Fortunately, residual interaction com-
ponents were significant for only 5 of the 29 participants 
(18 and 26-29). For participant 18, a square root trans-
formation (x 1 = IX+ lx+l, Kirk, 1968, pp. 64-65) rendered 
the Ability X Environmental Facility interaction residual 
nonsignificant, so that the results of this transformation 
are reported in Table 4. No suitable transformation could 
be found for the other four participants and the results 
of their individual analyses will not be discussed further. 
The general lack of significant residual interaction 
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components lent good support to the assumption that stimuli 
and response scales have interval properties. 
Ability X Environmental Facility interaction. In 
line with Statements 4 and 6, the Ability X Environmental 
Facility interaction was not significant in the analysis 
of aggregate data. However, individual analysis yielded 
a number of significant interaction terms, for participants 
9-16 and 22. For these participants, the bilinear campo-
nents accounted for an average of 53% of the interaction 
sum of squares. The means on which this interaction is 
based for participants 9, 10 and 12-15 are presented in 
Figure 4. As can be seen, the general picture is that of 
four diverging straight lines. The ability and environ-
mental facility cues combined multiplicatively such that 
differences in outcome judgments due to environmental 
facility are greater for high than for low ability levels. 
For these participants the importance of the course load 
in determining GPA was greater for high as compared to low 
intelligence. 
The pattern of this interaction, however, was not 
the same for all participants. These differences in pat-
tern contributed to the nonsignificant interaction for 
aggregate analysis. The means reflecting this interaction 
for participants 11 and 16 are presented in Figure 5. 
While the multiplicative relationship between ability and 
environmental facility is again evidenced, differences in 
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outcome judgments due to environmental facility were 
greater at low as compared to high ability levels. For 
these participants course load was more important for 
predictions of GPA at low rather than high intelligence 
levels. 
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The pattern for participant 22 showed four diverging 
straight lines, as in Figure 4, except that higher outcome 
judgments were made when environmental facility was low 
rather than high. 
Differences between Figures 4 and 5 may be more ap-
parent than real, depending upon the definition of ability. 
If low ability is considered a zero point and higher abil-
ity levels a deviation from that point, the pattern of 
Figure 4 would be expected. If, on the other hand, high 
ability were defined as the zero point and lower ability 
levels taken as a deviation from that point (negative num-
bers), the pattern described in Figure 5 would be expected. 
Differences similar to those described by Figures 4 and 5, 
appeared for a number of two-way interactions. These pat-
terns could result if the participants contributing to 
Figure 4 considered ability as a deviation from a certain 
baseline while the participants contributing to Figure 5 
considered ability as a deviation from an ideal. 
Ability~ Motivation interaction. The Ability X 
Motivation interaction is central to the descriptions of 
the naive analysis of action provided by Statements 4 and 
I I 
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6 . Although not significant for aggregate analysis, the 
bilinear component of the Ability X Motivation interaction 
was significant for 14 participants (9-21, and 23), accoun-
ting for an average of 62% of the interaction sum of 
squres. 
The pattern of means of this interaction for 11 of 
these participants (9,10,12-15, 18-21, and 23) is presented 
in Figure 6. The picture is of 4 diverging straight lines, 
although there is apparently little difference between the 
two highest motivation levels. The pattern is essentially 
that predicte~ by Statements 4 and 6 where differences due 
to motivation are greater at high as compared to low abil-
ity levels. Differences in predicted GPAs due to study 
habits were greater at high as compared to low intelli-
gence. These results are similar to those found by 
Anderson and Butzin (in press). 
The means for the Ability X Motivation interaction 
for participants 11, 16 and 17 are presented in Figure 7. 
The pattern is similar to that of Figure 5 presenting four 
converging straight lines. In constrast to Figure 6, this 
pattern reflects greater importance for differences in 
motivation at low rather than high ability levels. For 
these participants differences in study habits for the 
prediction of GPAs are more important for low intelligence 
than for high intelligence. 
II 
I 
I 
1
0 
I ~1l1' ~ ~ 
Iii 
' 
' 
,, I 
' ,II 
!l:i 
1.' t 
i.ll: 
:'I 
I 
'II 
. i 
8 
• CD 
0 
0 
• t-tn 
z 
Wo 
L9 
(!)::t 
p 
:Jg 
J• ,., 
0 
MOTIVATielN 
~ f>H 
)( X M+ 
h AM-
13 E!l L 
L M- M+ H 
ABILITY 
FIBURE S· MEAN elUTG~HE JU]GHENTS F6R 
ABILITY X M0TIVATI6N INTERACTI~N· 
PARTICIPANTS g, 10• 12-15• 18-21• 
AND 23· 
47 
8 
• CD 
8 
• f-LD 
z 
Wo 
~9 
(.!J::t 
p 
::Jg 
J• 
M 
w 
L:o 
0 D _._ 
u '" 
1-
::Jo 
o9 
.... 
0 
MCJTIVATielN 
~ ~H 
)( X M+ 
A ~ M-
[!) E!l L 
L M- M+ H 
ABILITY 
FIGURE 7· MEAN elUTC~HE JU]GHENTS F~R 
ABILITY X fi~0T I VATIC~~ I NTERACTielN • 
PARTICIPANTS 11• lS· AND 17· 
48 
49 
Environmental Facility X Motivation interation. 
This third two-way interaction is predicted by Statement 
4 but not Statement 6, and, as will be recalled, ~as not 
significant by aggregate analysis. Individual analysis 
revealed a significant bilinear component for the Envi-
ronmental Facility X Motivation interaction for seven 
participants (9-12, and 23-25) accounting for an average 
of 53.7% of the interaction sum of squares. 
The means for the Environmental Facility X Motiva-
tion interaction for three participants (9, 10, 15) are 
presented in Figure 8. The pattern is of four diverging 
lines where differences in outcome judgments due to moti-
vation are greater under high as compared to low environ-
mental facility. It is this pattern which is predicted 
by Statement 4. For these participants the importance of 
study habits in determining GPA was greater when the course 
load was light as compared to heavy. 
Figure 9 represents the means for participants 11, 
and 23-25. The pattern is of four converging lines where 
differences due to motivation are greater under low as 
compared to high environmental facility. Differences be-
tween Figures 8 and 9 are trivial if for the first three 
participants (Figure 8) environmental facility ranged from 
near zero (L) to some positive value (H) while for the 
other four participants (Figure 9) the range was from some 
negative value (L) to near zero (H). 
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Ability X Environmental Facility X Motivation inter-
action. Analyses of the trilinear component of the three-
way interaction were made for the four participants for 
whom the three, two-way interactions were significant. 
This was done to test the possibility that these partie-
ipants used a three-cue multiplying model (Shanteau & 
Anderson, 1972). The results of these analyses are pre-
sented in Table 5. The trilinear component was signif-
icant for participants 9-11 but not for participant 12. 
Model Analysis 
Causal schemata were constructed for participants 
in accordance with functional measurement theory. The 
interaction concentrated in the bilinear component. When 
interaction terms were not significant additive cue com-
b . t. . d d b . . f. . ff t 1 ~na ~on was ev~ ence y s~gn~ ~cant ma~n e ec s. 
1 According to functional measurement theory (Anderson, 
1970) multiplicative terms are indicated by significant cue 
interactions characterized wholly the Linear X Linear (bi-
linear) components and additive terms are indicated by sig-
nificant cue main effects and nonsignificant cue interac-
tions. When cue values all have the same sign, the simple 
multiplicative model, raj= w s., anticipates both a sig-
nificant bilinear interactionac6mponent and significant 
main effects. For this reason when both the interaction 
component and the cue main effects are significant only 
the multiplicative term is included in the judgment model. 
When the main effects are significant and the interaction 
component is not, additive terms are included in the model. 
Strictly speaking, the simple multiplicative model described 
about cannot be distinguished from a more general model 
which includes both additive and multiplicative components: 
Table 5 
F Ratios for Trilinear and Residual Components of 
The Three-Way Interaction for Outcome Judgments 
Participant Trilinear Residual Proportion of 
Sum of Squares 
9 4.28* 1.52 .34 
* 10 6.24 .38 .40 
* 11 18.85 .41 .65 
12 .32 .38 .03 
df 1/63 26/63 
* < .OS p 
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St~ictly speaking, only four participants' judgments 
could be characterized by Statement 6 (18-21), while par-
ticipant 17 used a similar judgment model. Only one par-
ticipant (23) showed both the Ability X Motivation and 
the Environmental Facility X Motivation interactions antic-
ipated by Statement 4, and the latter interaction was of a 
form different from that expected. Together, some twelve 
different models were needed to characterize the judgments 
of the 25 participants. Ignoring the differences in orien-
tation illustrated by comparison of Figures 4, 6 and 8 with 
Figures 5, 7 and 9, some seven differe~t causal schemata 
were needed. These will be discussed in turn. 
Participants 1-8 used variations of a general linear 
model. For the first six of these participants, this sche-
rna took the same form as that for the aggregate data: 
Outcome + Ability + Environmental Facility 
+ Motivation. (9) 
Participants 7 and 8 ignored the environmental facility 
cue and thus their model included only two terms: 
Outcome = Ability + Motivation. (9a) 
Statements 9 and 9a represent multiple sufficient causal 
schemata where the effect of any one cue was independent 
of the others. 
The Ability X Environmental Facility interaction 
raj = c 1 wa + c 2 sj + c 3wasj + c 4 , 
stants (Anderson, 1970, p. 165). 
where the c's are con-
was not expected by either Statements 4 or 6 and was not 
evidenced for aggregate analysis. The finding of a sig-
nificant bilinear component for 9 of 26 participants is 
far above the number expected by chance (1 of 20) and 
does not support Heider's (1958) hypothesized multiple 
sufficient causal schema for inferring another's capa-
bilities (Statement 2). 
The judgment rule for three participants included 
this Ability X Environmental Facility interaction with 
the expected Ability X Motivation interaction (13-15): 
Outcome = Ability (Environmental Facility 
55 
+ Motivation), (lOa) 
where ability multiplied both environmental facility and 
motivation. These two interactions were also significant 
for participant 16 except that differences due to environ-
mental facility and motivation were smaller at high rather 
than low ability levels. Assuming that this difference 
was due to a different orientation to the ability cue, 
the judgment model would be: 
Outcome = (-) Ability (Environmental Facility 
+ Motivation), (lOb) 
where this symbol (-) indicates that the participant's 
subjective view of the cue level ranged from negative (L) 
to zero (H) rather than from zero (L) to positive (H). 
Similar notation will be used throughout the paper. 
While participants 17-21 only showed a significant 
56 
Ability X Motivation interaction indicating that Statement 
6 was the appropriate causal schema, differences due to 
motivation levels for participant 17 converged rather than 
diverged at high ability levels. The causal schema for 
this participant is described in Statement 6a: 
Outcome = «-)Ability X Motivation} 
+ Environmental Facility. (6a) 
While analysis of participant 23's judgments revealed 
both interactions anticipated by Statement 4, differences 
due to motivation were smaller at high rather than low 
environmental facility levels. This judgment model can 
be described: 
" '
Outcome = Motivation {Ability X (-) Environmental 
Facility), (4a) 
where differences due to motivation diverged as ability 
increased and converged as environmental facility increased. 
Only two participants (24 and 25) showed only an 
Environmental Facility X Motivation interaction, although 
this interaction was significant for 7 of 26 participants 
overall. The pattern of the interaction was such that 
differences due to motivation were smaller at high compared 
to low environmental facility levels indicating this schema: 
Outcome= Ability+((-)Environmental Facility 
X Motivationj . (11) 
Four participants, 9 through 12, utilized all three, 
two-way interactions. In addition, the trilinear component 
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of the A~ility X Environmental Facility X Motivation in-
teraction was significant for participants 9-11, suggest-
ing a three cue multiplying model. For participants 9 and 
10 the judgment model is: 
Outcome = Ability X Environmental Facility 
X Motivat~on, (12a) 
where differences in outcome judgment due to motivation 
increased as environmental facility increased and this 
increase in differences due to motivation increased as 
ability increased. The model for participant ll presents 
a different picture, 
Outcome = (-) Ability X (-) Environmental Facility 
X Motivation, (12b) 
where differences in outcome judgments due to motivation 
decreased as environmental facility increased and this 
decrease in motivation differences decreased as ability 
increased. The judgment model for participant 12 contains 
the products of the three two-cue combinations: 
Outcome = (Ability X Environmental Facility 
+ (Ability X Motivation) 
+ (Environmental Facility X Motivation), 
(12c) 
which includes aspects of Statements 4 and lOa. 
The judgments of participant 22 differ significantly 
from those of other participants since outcomes increased 
as environmental facility decreased. This judgment pattern 
I ,'I, 
.~.i 
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maY reflect the natural covariance between high marks and 
heavy course load due to selection on ability. While the 
independence of the three cues was explained fully to each 
participant, participant 22 may have ignored these instruc-
tions or may have been unable to ignore the natural covar-
iance between grades and course load. The resultant sche-
rna for this judge is: 
Outcome = (Ability/Environmental Facility) 
+ Motivation. (13) 
Ability Judgments: Aggregate Analysis 
Results of the analysis of ability judgments for all 
29 participants are presented in Table 6. Again Partici-
pants and Replications are treated as random factors and 
the judgment cues are treated as fixed factors. 
Table 6 reveals that the three cue main effects were 
significant, accounting for approximately 67.3% of the 
total variance. The mean ability judgments for each level 
of these three cues are presented in Table 7. Judged abil-
ity increased as outcome increased and decreased as both 
environmental facility and motivation increased. It should 
also be noted from this table, that the equal spacing 
assumption for cue levels again is not met. Therefore, 
weights for trend analysis of the interaction terms were 
computed from the marginal means. 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance for Ability Judgment Scores 
source MS df F w2 
Subjects 14.33 28 .024 
Replications 3.27 1 .000 
outcome (A) 721.65 3 1958.48** .470 
Environmental 
Facility (B) 207.09 3 561. 98** .135 
Motivation (C) 104.19 3 282.74** .068 
A X B 3.68 9 9.99** .006 
Linear X Linear 25.30 1 68.38** . 829a 
Residual .90 8 2.43* .17la 
A X c 1. 41 9 3.83** .002 
Linear X Linear 7.31 1 19.76** .645a 
Residual .65 8 1. 74 .355a 
B X c .25 9 • 68 .000 
A X B X c .34 27 .92 .000 
Polled 
Error .37 3619 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
aEstimate of proportion of interaction variance accounted 
for by specific interaction component (Vaughn & Corballis, 
1969). 
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Table 7 
Ability Judgment Means for Cue Main Effects 
Level 
cue 
L M- M+ H 
outcome 2.47 2.76 3.90 4.30 
Environmental 
Facility 3.88 3.62 3.05 2.87 
Motivation 3.73 3.49 3.25 2.95 
Note.- Means can range from 0.0-6.0; the higher the mean, 
the higher the judged ability. 
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In addition to the main effects, both the Outcome X 
Environmental Facility and the Outcome X Motivation inter-
action were significant. The bilinear trend of the Out-
come X Environmental Facility interaction accounted for 
nearly all the interaction variance (82.9%) although the 
residual component of this interaction was also signifi-
cant. The means for this interaction are presented in 
Figure 10 and, generally, present a picture of four diver-
ging straight lines. A slight deviation from this trend 
is observable since ability levels for M+ and H environ-
mental facility converge rather than d~verge at H outcome. 
The primary relationship depicted in this figure is that 
low as compared to high environment facility caused higher 
ability judgments and that this difference was accentuated 
as outcome increased. The bilinear trend of the Outcome 
X Motivation interaction was also significant accounting 
for 64.5% of the interaction variance. The residual com-
ponent of this interaction was not significant. The means 
for this interaction are presented in Figure 11, showing 
a picture of four diverging straight lines. Low as com-
pared to high motivation led to higher ability judgments 
and this difference increased as outcome increased. 
The means for the Environmental Facility X Motivation 
interaction are presented in Figure 12. Since this inter-
action was not significant, the anticipated picture is of 
four parallel straight lines. This is the case. 
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As~uming that the significant residual component of 
the Outcome X Environmental Facility interaction was due 
to non-interval scale properties for some participants, 
the analysis presented in Table 6 yields this causal schema: 
Ability = Outcome 
Environmental 
F_acility 
+ Outcome 
Motivation, 
(14) 
where ability is equal to the sum of the ratios of outcome 
to environmental facility and outcome to motivation. 
Ability Judgments: Individual Analysis 
A repeated measures analysis of variance, similar to 
that performed on outcome judgments, was performed on each 
participant's ability judgments. The results of this anal-
ysis are presented in Table 8. Percentage of variance 
estimates, w2 , for analysis terms are presented in Appendix 
B. 
Main effects. The Ability and Environmental Facility 
effects were significant for all participants and the Moti-
vation main effect was significant for all but two (2 and 
22). In all cases judged ability increased with higher 
GPAs (outcome) and decreased with lighter course loads (en-
vironmental facility) and with higher effort (motivation). 
On the average, outcome, environmental facility and motiva-
tion cues accounted for 53.2%, 16.7%, and 8.9% of the judg-
ment variance, respectively. 
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Table 8 
F Ratios for Model Analysis, Ability Judgments 
Participants Main Effects 
with only Outcome Environmental Motivation 
Main Effects (A) Facility (B) (c) 
1* 204 48 31 
7 354 79 25 
16 59 34 19 
25 114 44 67 
Participants 
with signif-
icant inter-
actions 
2 71 35 1.41 
3* 190 28 12 
9 126 74 42 
11 87 38 55 
12 200 37 19 
13 254 166 15 
17 58 43 8 
24 205 101 46 
26 63 23 6 
4 66 58 26 
10 211 34 5 
15 147 62 26 
22 119 11 1.89 
28 56 9 34 
5 70 37 17 
14 115 17 21 
18 318 138 28 
19 73 14 7 
20 295 12 18 
23* 13 9 86 49 
29 770 63 61 
8 52 65 25 
Participants 
with signif-
icant residuals 
6 628 88 75 
21 234 13 29 
27 345 76 74 
df 3/63 3/63 3/63. 
Note.- Significant and nonsignificant Fs given to 0 and 2 
decimal places, respectively. 
*Squareroot transformation. 
Table 8 (Continued} 
F Ratios for Model Analysis, Ability Judgments 
Participants Bilinear Interactions 
with only 
Main Effects A X B A X c B X c 
1* 1. 58 3.41 .09 
7 2.10 • 8 0 .41 
16 3.76 .57 .31 
25 .22 .02 2.49 
Participants 
with signif-
icant inter-
actions 
2 6 17 .27 
3* 6 6 1.70 
9 10 24 .09 
11 19 27 .09 
12 13 8 .19 
13 68 11 2.06 
17 41 39 1.31 
...... 79 l6 • 0 2 
26 27 12 .78 
4 5 .48 .12 
10 4 . 01 .56 
15 13 .24 .00 
22 8 2.61 .36 
28 11 2.44 1.05 
5 .85 11 .so 
14 .78 4 .35 
18 2.45 4 .10 
19 .52 24 .56 
20 3.36 12 1.25 
I 
23* 2.66 1.99 7 
29 . 08 .20 8 
8 9 2.82 5 
Participants 
with sign if-
icant residuals 
6 6 7 8 
21 5 2.09 . 0 9 
27 .42 . 0 0 2.11 
df 1/63 l/63 1/63 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
F Ratios for Model Analysis, Ability Judgments 
Participants Residual Interactions Three-way Inter-
with only action 
Main Effects A X B A X c B X c A X B X c 
1* 2.01 1. 43 .9.6 1.21 
7 1.16 . 63 1. 74 1.14 
16 1. 20 1. 08 .49 1. 04 
25 .85 .93 • 58 .31 
Participants 
with signif-
icant inter-
actions 
2 .81 1. 41 1. 26 .92 
3* 1.96 1.33 .58 .91 
9 1.72 .70 .89 1.49 
11 .59 .60 1. 84 1. 68 
12 1.09 .51 .65 1.27 
13 . 27 .54 .54 .62 
17 1. 61 1.22 .80 .80 
24 1.59 1. 05 .57 .87 
26 1. 09 .45 1.16 1. 05 
4 1.31 1. 27 1.99 1. 67 
10 1.45 1. 62 1. 61 .63 
15 1.27 1.02 .95 1.41 
22 .76 1. 53 .87 .55 
28 • 98 .91 • 3 0 .92 
5 • 7 0 1. 46 1.19 1. 30 
14 1. 78 1. 79 1. 25 .50 
18 .28 1.38 1.23 1.01 
I 
.46 19 1. 01 . 61 .79 
II 20 1.31 .82 1. 45 .72 
23* 1.98 .80 1.15 .65 ii: 
''I' 
29 .88 .99 .62 1.39 I' 
8 .62 .74 .18 .30 ::1 It Participants 
with signif-
,,,, 
:Iii 
icant residuals ,II '1: 
6 3 2 2 1.71 II 
! 
21 2 5 1.81 1.29 
27 2 1. 39 .77 1.70 l!i' df 8/63 8/63 8/63 27/63 :1'! 
i i 
II li 
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Since analysis of aggregate data found the residual 
component of the Outcome X Environmental Facility inter-
action significant, it was important to examine this term 
in the individual analyses. The residual component of this 
interaction was significant for 6 of 29 participants. For 
3 of these participants (1, 3, and 33) a square root trans-
formation eliminated this source of variation. Since no 
transformation could be found to eliminate the residual 
variance for participants 6, 21, and 27, the results of 
analysis of their judgments will not be discussed further. 
Since none of the residual components for three two-way 
interactions were significant for 23 of the 29 participants, 
the assumption that stimulus and response scales had in-
terval properties was supported. 
Outcome X Environmental Facility interaction. While 
neither Statement 7 nor 8 anticipanted that the Outcome X 
Environmental Facility interaction would be significant, 
both the bilinear and residual components were significant 
for aggregate analysis. Individual analyses indicated a 
significant bilinear component for the Outcome X Environ-
mental Facility interaction for 15 of the 26 participants 
accounting for an average of 60% of the interaction sum 
of squares. These participants are 2, 3, 9, ll, 12, 13, 
17, 24, 26, 4, 10, 15, 22, 28, and 8, as listed in Table 8. 
The means of this interaction for these participants are 
presented in Figure 13. For once the pattern of interaction 
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has taken· only one form for all participants. The pattern 
shown in this figure is of four diverging straight lines 
where low environmental facility causas greater ability 
judgments than high environmental facility and this dif-
ference is accentuated as outcome increases. This par-
ticipants inferred greater ability when course load was 
heavy as compared to light and this difference increased 
as GPA increased. A slight divergence from the bilinear 
trend, similar to that evidenced for aggregate data, can 
be noted for M+ and H environmental facility at H outcome. 
These points are closer than would be expected from the 
bilinear trend. 
Outcome X Motivation interaction. This interaction 
was predicted by both Statements 7 and 8 and only the bi-
linear component was significant for aggregate analysis. 
The means for this interaction for twelve of the 14 partie-
ipants for whom the bilinear component was significant are 
presented in Figure 14. These participants, in order listed 
in Table 8, are 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 24, 26, 5, 19, and 
20. For these participants the bilinear component accounted 
for an average of 69.8% of the interaction sum of squares. 
The pattern presented in this figure is of four diverging 
straight lines where greater ability is inferred for low as 
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compared to high motivation and this difference is 
accentuated as outcome increases. Participants assigned 
greater ability when effort was low as compared to high 
and this difference increased as GPA increased. This 
interaction was not observed by Anderson and Butzin (in 
press) but appears to be quite strong in these data. 
The means for this interaction for participants 14 
and 18 are presented in Figure 15. Generally this pic-
ture is of four converging lines but deviations form 
linearity are apparent. In addition, the bilinear trend 
accounted for the lowest proportion of the interaction 
sum of squares of all bilinear components discussed, 27.0%. 
For these participants, low as compared to high motivation 
caused greater ability judgments but this difference de-
creased as outcome increased. 
Environmental Facility X Motivation interaction. 
The form of the Environmental Facility X Motivation inter-
action predicted by Statement 8 would have higher ability 
judgments for low as compared to high motivation with this 
difference decreasing as environmental facility increases. 
However, this pattern was not exactly that shown by par-
ticipants 23, 29, and 8 whose data yielded significant 
bilinear components for this interaction. The pattern of 
means for these participants are presented in Figure 16. 
While higher ability judgments were made for low as com-
pared to high motivation, this difference increased as 
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environmental facility increased. For these participants, 
differences in judged ability due to effort expended were 
most apparent for lighter course loads. While the number 
of participants for whom this interaction was significant 
was small, it was greater than would be expected by chance. 
Also, the bilinear components accounted for an average of 
63% of the interaction sum of squares. 
Outcome X Environmental Facility X Motivation inter-
action. This interaction was of borderline significance 
for two of the participants, 11 and 4. The trilinear com-
ponent of this interaction was not significant for either 
participant {F < 1; F = 3.42, df = 1/63, p > .05 1 respec-
tively). Since 2 of 26 was not much higher than would be 
expected by chance {1 of 20) and since both interactions 
were of borderline significance, the discrepancies which 
these interactions suggest were ignored. 
Model Analysis 
Taken together, six models were needed to describe 
the causal schemata used by the 26 participants discussed, 
ignoring differences illustrated by contrasting Figures 13 
and 14. Generally, the problem was not as severe for abil-
ity judgments as for outcome judgments. 
Four participants 1, 7, 16, and 25, used an additive 
model for combining outcome, environmental facility, and 
motivation in making ability judgments, 
Ability = Outcome-Environmental Facility-Motivation(l5) 
77 
por these participants, ability judgments increased with 
outcome and decreased with environmental facility and 
motivation. Each cue was independent of the other two. 
Two of these participants, 1 and 7, also used additive 
models in making outcome judgments. 
Nine participants, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 24, and 
26, used the same schema suggested by aggregate analysis 
(Statement 14) • These participants combined the Outcome 
x Motivation interaction predicted by Statements 7 and 8 
with the Outcome X Environmental Facility interaction 
which neither statement anticipated. This model indicates 
that differences in ability due both to environmental fa-
cility and to motivation increased as outcomes increased. 
For four participants, 1, 10, 15, and 28, only the 
Outcome X Environmental Facility interaction was signifi-
cant. In this case only differences due to environmental 
facility (and not motivation) increased with outcome. The 
schema for these participants is: 
Ability = Outcome 
Environmental 
Facility 
- Motivation. (lSa) 
Participant 22 also showed a significant Outcome X Environ-
mental Facility interaction but no Motivation main effect. 
For this participant the model is: 
Ability = Outcome 
Environmental 
Facility. 
( lSb) 
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Five participants showed only the Outcome X Motiva-
tion interaction, as suggested by Statement 7. However 
for three of these participants, 5, 19, and 20, differences 
due to motivation increased with outcomes while for the 
other two, 14 and 18, differences due to motivation de-
creased as outcomes increased. In the first case the 
model is: 
Ability = Outcome 
Motivation 
- Environmental Facility (16a) 
and in the second: 
Ability = (-) Outcome - Environmental Facility. (16b) 
(-) Motivation 
The sign, (-), has the same meaning here as in previous 
examples. It will be recalled that the interactions which 
necessitated model 16b were the two weakest of the inter-
actions discussed. 
Three participants showed a significant Environmental 
Facility X Motivation interaction as predicted by Statement 
7, although not of the same form. In addition, in no case 
was a participant's causal schema the same as that predicted 
by Statement 7, including both the Outcome X Motivation and 
the Environmental Facility X motivation interactions. For 
two of the participants for whom this latter interaction 
term was significant (23, 29), ability judgments were higher 
for low as compared to high motivation and this difference 
increased as environmental facility increased. In addition, 
ability judgments increased as outcome increased, but this 
-------------·~-~ 
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cue was independent of the other two. In this case the 
judgment model is: 
Ability = Outcome - Environmental Facility 
(-) Motivation (17a) 
For participant 8, differences due to environmental facility 
also increased as outcome increased indicating this model: 
Ability = Outcome 
Environmental 
Facility 
- Environmental Facility 
(-) Motivation (17b) 
In summary, neither Statements 4 and 6 for outcome 
judgments nor Statements 7 and 8 for ability judgments re-
ceived much support from either aggregate or individual 
analysis. 
Reversibility 
The validity of Hypothesis 3, that an individual's 
causal schema will be algebraically similar for both out-
come and ability judgments, cannot be assessed statisti-
cally. However, it appears that reversibility is not a 
characteristic of the naive analysis of action, as repre-
sented in this study. Of the 23 participants for whom 
both outcome and ability judgment models could be developed 
(excluding participants 6, 21, and 26-69) only 3 showed 
strict algebraic equivalence and only one of these, 13, 
used configural terms. Participants 1 and 7 used additive 
models for both judgment tasks, but for participant 7 envi-
ronmental facility was not part of his outcome judgment 
rule. Finally, reversibility was not evidenced for 
aggregate analysis. 
I 
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If reversibility is assumed only to apply only to 
individual terms in the causal schemata and not to the 
entire schema itself, and if differences in interaction 
patterns indicated by the (-) symbol are ignored, the 
concept of reversibility receives some support. Six par-
2 
ticipants (26.1%) showed both an Ability X Environmental 
Facility interaction for outcome judgments and an Outcome 
X Environmental Facility interaction for ability judgments. 
Nine participants (39.1%) showed both the Ability X Motiva-
tion interaction for outcome judgments and the Outcome X 
Motivation interaction for ability judgments. For one 
participant (4.6%) the Environmental Facility X Motivation 
interaction was significant both for outcome and for abil-
ity judgments. The chance levels for the co-occur~ence 
of these corresponding interactions are 19.8%, 31.9%, and 
2.6%, respectively. 
Individual Difference Measures 
Four individual difference measures were administered 
to each participant: a measure of intelligence (IQ); a 
measure of achievement motivation (Ach); and a measure with 
preference subscales for internal or external causal expla-
nation (IE) and stable or variable causal explanation (SV). 
2Participant 22 was omitted from this analysis since 
the form of his Ability X Environmental Facility inter-
action differed from that of all other participants. 
l 
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Since the number of participants in the study was small, 
the relationship between these measures and use of partie-
ular judgment rules is taken as speculative and hypothesis 
generating. Also, since consistency in the use of any one 
model was low, participants were divided into three groups 
for each of the two-way interactions: (a) consistent, 
corresponding interaction terms were significant for both 
outcome and ability judgments; (b) inconsistent, only one 
of the corresponding interaction terms were significant; 
and (c) none, neither of the corresponding interaction 
terms were significant. The mean scor3s on each of the 
individual difference measures for each group are pre-
sented in Table 9. 
It should be noted that none of the differences 
between means of any cue interaction are significant by 
Duncan's Multiple Range Test at the .05 level. This can 
be attributed to a number of factors including size of 
sample and restriction in range due to homogeniety of 
sample. 
While there are no statistically significant dif-
ferences between groups on the individual difference 
measures, there are two tendencies which can be used 
to guide further research. It appears that those par-
ticipants for whom interaction terms were significant 
(consistent and inconsistent groups) had slightly higher 
IQ scores than those not showing significant interaction 
1 
t 
Table 9 
Mean Individual Difference Scores for Participants Grouped 
By Consistency of usage for Three, Two-way Interactions 
Ability X Environmental Facility 
Outcome X Environmental Facility 
Measure 
IQa b IEC svd Group N Ach 
Consistent 6 121.3 -.67 23.5 24.0 
Inconsistent 8 120.5 10.25 25.5 25.0 
None 8 116.9 .06 23.6 23.7 
Ability X Motivation--Outcome X Motivation 
Group 
Consistent 
Inconsistent 
None 
N 
9 
8 
6 
IQ 
120.0 
119.0 
116.3 
Measure 
Ach 
-.22 
2.25 
10.00 
IE 
23.8 
25.1 
25.0 
sv 
23.6 
24.6 
24.8 
Environmental Facility X Motivation 
Measure 
Group N IQ Ach IE sv 
Consistent 1 111.00 -.80 24.0 26.0 
Inconsistent 7 121.29 6.00 24.4 24.7 
None 15 118.00 4.13 24.4 24.0 
aHigher the mean, the higher the IQ. 
b . h H1g er the mean, higher achievement motivation. 
c Higher the mean, greater the preference for external 
dHigher the mean, greater the preference for variable 
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terms. In addition, the correlation between IQ scores 
and the number of significant interaction terms overall 
was low but positive (E = .25, df = 21). There was also 
a tendency for those consistent in their use of interac-
tion terms to have lower achievement scores. The corre-
lation between achievement scores and the number of sig-
nificant interaction terms is negative for outcome judg-
ments (E = -.36, df = 23) and positive (E = .13, df = .23) 
for ability judgments, suggesting that those participants 
with higher achievement scores tended to perceive the 
tasks as different. For these participants, the predic-
tion of outcomes and the inference of ability, in the 
particular achievement setting used, may represent dif-
ferent judgment tasks. 
There seems to have been little correspondence be-
tween use of interaction terms and either IE or SV scores. 
DISCUSSION 
I The results of this study contain a number of im-
portant implications for understanding human attribution. 
First, quantitative analysis of judgments of other's ac-
tions is not only possible but fruitful and enlightening. 
Secondly, the naive analysis of action is indeed a complex 
process involving a number of configura! cues. And third-
ly, the individual difference measures studied did not 
reveal much information about why any one individual used 
a certain pattern of cue interaction. Each of these topics 
will be discussed in turn. 
Functional Measurement and Cognitive Algebra 
Functional measurement analysis was quite useful in 
uncovering patterns in the judgments of outcome and abil-
ity. Since only the bilinear component was significant 
for most interaction terms, both the interval scaling as-
sumption and the underlying judgment model received good 
support. Also, the participant by participant analysis 
was quite important since aggregate analysis obscured 
wide individual differences in judgment strategies. This 
individual analysis is not open to the criticism that it 
capitalized on chance since the bilinear component had 
only one degree of freedom, specifically congruent with 
84 
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multiplicative effects (Shanteau & Anderson, 1972). 
The question of reversibility in cognitive algebra 
' 
is of great importance for the construction of individual 
judgment rules. If the causal schemata constructed in 
1 this study do in fact characterize the participants judg-
ment strategies, strict reversibility should have been 
evidenced. The fact was that individual and aggregate 
judgment rules were not reversible from outcome to abil-
ity judgments, thus underlying the "paramorphic problem" 
for mathematical models of human judgments. The algebraic 
models developed for individual participants cannot be 
said to represent fully individual judgment strategies 
since reversibility was not found. Even if this lack of 
consistency were due to participant's perceptions of the 
outcome and ability judgment tasks as qualitatively dif-
ferent, as was hypothesized for participants high in 
achievement motivation, the objective similarity between 
these two laboratory judgment tasks far exceeds the simi-
larity to be found between any two judgment tasks partie-
ipants would normally encounter. Support for the rever-
sibility of individual cue interactions suggests that 
this concept may not be dichotomous but rather a contin-
uous variable along which both individuals and tasks can 
differ. Some individuals such as the more intelligent 
or the cognitively simple, may exhibit greater consistency 
in the use of judgment rules. Some tasks, such as 
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predictions (outcome judgment) or inferences (ability 
judgment), may encourage greater consistency. Finally, 
the lack of consistency may be due to the complexity of 
the judgment tasks used. Some participants may have sim-
plified multiplicative cue combinations to additive com-
binations on either the outcome or the ability judgment 
task. Shanteau and Anderson (1972) suggest this possibil-
ity as an explanation for individual differences in models 
which they found for judgments of the value of certain 
pieces of information. While there is no evidence to sup-
port this hypothesis in the present study, it implies that 
further qualification of algebraic models of human infer-
ence judgments is necessary. 
The tentative conclusion is that algebraic judgment 
models are only analogous to individual causal schemata 
since the algebraic property of reversibility is not pos-
sessed by individual causal judgment strategies. Anderson 
(1974) classifies algebraic rules as "formal, ~ if models" 
since the underlying mechanisms of averaging and multipli-
cation cannot be specified. The use of related judgments 
tasks in the present study, however, helped to uncover 
the additional qualification of algebraic models of causal 
judgments that individuals show different causal schemata 
for judgments of outcome and of ability. 
The Perception of Causality 
While the quantitative analysis of individuals' 
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judgments of another's actions did not yield precise 
mathematical formulas, it did uncover at least two con-
figural terms often used in attribution. One was the 
energizing and qualifying effect of another's motivation 
and effort. For 15 of 25 participants, th€ combination 
of ability and motivation for prediction of outcome was 
not additive but rather configural, the importance of 
the ability was dependent on the motivational cue. Simi-
larily, 14 of 26 participants combined the outcome and 
the motivation cues in a configural manner for judgments 
of ability. For these participants the evidence of abil-
ity shown by the outcome level needed to be qualified by 
the amount of effort expended. These findings are gen-
erally supportive of the attributional theory of perfor-
mance proposed by Heider (Statement 3) and developed by 
Weiner, Kukla and their associates (Kukla, 1972; Weiner, 
Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1972). 
The other configural terms often used in the naive 
analysis of action were the combination of ability and 
environmental facility cues for outcome judgments (9 of 
25 participants) and the combination of outcome and en-
vironmental facility cues for ability judgments (15 of 
26 participants). These interactions contradict the 
multiple sufficient causal schema for judgments of cap-
ability (Statement 3) suggested by Heider (1958). For 
these participants the ability and environmental facility 
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cues were not functionally equivalent since the importance 
of one cue was dependent on the level of the other. 
The meaning of the Environmental Facility X Motiva-
tion interactions for both judgments tasks is not clear 
since this term was used only by a few participants. The 
lack of interaction for outcome judgments may be taken as 
support for the model of judgment suggested by Anderson 
(Statement 6) if the assumption of reversibility is not 
made. Generally, it appears that, for the judgment tasks 
studied, intended or expended effort does not qualify the 
facility of the environment. 
Two points need to be made concerning the percentage 
of variance accounted for, w2 , by the cue main effects and 
interactions. For the outcome judgment task used in the 
present study (GPA), the environmental facility cue (course 
load) was not as important as either the ability or the 
motivation cue. While this may be due to constriction in 
the range of values that the environmental facility cue 
was allowed to assume, pretesting seemed to rule out this 
interpretation. In addition, the outcome cue accounted 
for nearly half of the ability judgment variance (aggre-
gate analysis). Both these findings may be taken as evi-
dence for a general tendency to underestimate the impor-
tance of extenuating circumstances when judging another's 
actions. Jones and Nisbett (1972, p. 80) present evidence 
that 
.there is a pervasive tendency for actors 
to attribute their actions to situational 
factors, whereas observers tend to attribute 
the same actions to stable personality dispo-
sitions [emphasis omitted]. 
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In the present study, participants tended to base judgments 
of another's actions (GPA) on internal rather than external 
factors, and another's outcomes were of primary importance 
in determining his ability. In the latter case, extenuating 
circumstances, such as course load or expended effort, were 
of relatively little importance. 
The second point concerning the use of the statistic 
is that the general linear model (analysis of variance) 
will not accurately reflect the amount of variance due to 
interaction terms. Yntema and Torgensen (cited in Green, 
1968) generated data which was related to the independent 
variables only in an interactive way, Y. "k = ij + jk + ik. 
~J 
Analysis of variance showed that the three main effects 
accounted for 94% of the variance allowing only 6% of the 
variance for the interactions. Similar results were evi-
denced in the present study where the average estimate of 
variance accounted for by all interaction terms in indi-
vidual analysis was 2.8% for outcome judgments and 3.7% 
for ability judgments. It appears that the general con-
elusion favoring strictly linear models over those which 
incorporate configura! terms (e.g., Wiggins,~ al., 1969) 
has rested on a methodology (regression analysis) which, 
like analysis of variance, utilizes the general linear 
r 90 
model. Since these models are insensitive to the amount 
of variance accounted for by configura! components, it is 
quite possible that more subjects were using configura! 
models than the researchers were aware of. 
Individual Differences 
While the analysis of both outcome and ability 
judgments revealed wide and important differences in 
causal schemata, the individual differences measures used 
in this study added little to the understanding of these 
rules. Whether this was due to the unreliability of the 
measures, restriction of the sample, or a genuine lack of 
relationship is unknown. More work on this important 
·--.:- ~ .... 
..... vr ,..""' .... _, !'lC di~~'.lSSion 
has been made of demographic characteristics (age, sex, 
race) which are of obvious importance to the perception 
of causality since there were so few participants. This 
omission, of course, limits the generalizability of the 
findings. Finally, efforts need to be made to extend 
this type of quantitative analysis to other judgment 
tasks such as predicted poker winnings or marriage 
success. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Cue Labels and Identification for 
Outcome and Ability Judgment Tasks 
~-------
Level 
Label 
Identi-
fication 
a 
GPA 
Level 
Label 
Identi-
fication 
GPA 
Level 
Label 
Identi-
fication 
GPA 
a Expected 
Table A-1 
Cue Labels and Identification for Outcome Judgment Task 
Ability 
L M-
Low Below 
Average 
90 IQ 105 IQ 
1.8 2 . 3 
Environmental Facility 
L 
Heavy 
Calculus 4 
Gen. Biol. 4 
Gen. Chern. 4 
Inter. Fr. 3 
Amer. Lit. 3 
Intro. Psych.3 
21 Hrs. Total 
1.5 
M-
Above 
Average 
Phil. of Man 3 
Writing I 3 
Inter. Span. 3 
Speech 3 
World History 3 
Algebra 3 
18 Hrs. Total 
2. 2 
M+ 
Above 
Average 
115 IQ 
2.8 
(Course Load) 
M+ 
Below 
Average 
Art Apprec. 3 
World Hist. 3 
Old Test. Theol. 3 
Natural Science 3 
Intra. Psych. 3 
15 Hrs. Total 
2.9 
Motivation (Studies) 
L M- M+ 
Little Below Above 
Average Average 
Sleepy Immature Compulsive 
Aimless Aggressive Orderly 
Inefficient Impulsive Anxious 
1.7 2. 2 2.7 
quartile average. 
H 
High 
130 IQ 
3. 3 
H 
Light 
Basic Spanish 3 
Nat'l Science 3 
Algebra 3 
Speech 3 
12 Hrs. Total 
3.6 
H 
Hard 
Conscientious 
Dedicated 
Ambitious 
3. 2 ..... 
0 
0 
Table A-2 
Cue Labels and Identification for Ability Judgment Task 
Level 
Label 
Identi-
fication 
GPA 
Level 
Label 
Identi-
fication 
GPA 
Outcome (GPA) 
L M- M+ 
Low Below Above 
Average Average 
First Second Third 
Quartile Quartile Quartile 
1.5 2.1 2.7 
Environmental Facility (Course Load) 
(Same as Table A-l) 
Motivation (Studied) 
L M- M+ 
Little Below Above 
Average Average 
Lowest Less than Mor.e than 
Quarter Average Average 
(Not used) 
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H 
High 
Fourth 
Quartile 
3.3 
H 
Hard 
Highest 
Quarter 
APPENDIX B: 
Percentage of Variance Estimates, w2 , 
for Individual Analyses of Outcome 
and Ability Judgments. 
~~--------------------------------------------~ 
'~ 
Tabla B-1 
Percentage of Variance Estimat~s, w2, Related to the Effects 
Of the Analyses of Variance of Outcome Judgments 
Partie- Ability Environmental Motiva ti·:>n 
ipant (A) Facility (B) (c) A X B A X C B X C A X B X C Total 
1 .387 .038 .413 -.004 .000 .001 .050 .869 
2 .182 .260 .197 .012 -.003 -.021 -.040 .651 
3 .393 .126 .219 -.011 . 0 0 0 -.009 -.022 .738 
4 .299 .050 .477 .008 -.003 -.007 -.015 .834 
5 .250 .311 .198 .005 -.006 -.006 .009 .773 
6 .444 .043 .381 . 0 0 0 -.006 .010 -.007 .878 
7 .720 -.002 .198 -.001 -.004 -.003 • 0 0 0 .918 
8 .231 .018 .050 -.024 -.028 -.002 .044 .343 
9 .308 .265 .208 .005 .025 .021 .019 .851 
10 .349 .065 .276 .001 . 0 0 2 .012 -.028 .705 
11 .317 .044 .412 .017 .004 .005 .003 .802 
12 .246 .067 .495 .009 .013 .002 -.024 .832 
13 .395 .063 .464 ,008 .012 .002 -.003 .944 
14 .391 .075 .291 -.001 .038 -.006 -.003 .795 
15 .138 .157 .421 .011 .011 . 0 0 2 .023 .763 
16 .336 .101 .276 -.008 -.002 .035 -.017 .748 
17 .526 .051 .144 -.005 .022 -.013 -.016 .743 
18* . 33 0 .095 .243 .014 .014 .007 .020 .723 
19 .550 .066 .193 .001 .006 -.007 .011 .827 
20 .496 .034 .386 .016 .026 .006 .016 .980 
21 .605 .030 .210 .008 .005 . 010 .001 .869 
22 .539 .005 .096 -.013 -.013 -.009 -.039 .744 
23 .503 .047 .296 .007 -.002 .002 -.018 .845 
24 .399 .149 .268 . 0 0 0 ~.oo5 .004 .011 .831 
25 .206 .095 .525 -.002 .008 -.006 .018 .852 
26 .048 .726 .111 .009 .001 .010 .018 .923 
27 .379 .025 .400 .026 -.002 .010 -.002 .840 
28 .550 .006 .193 .001 .006 -.007 .011 .827 
29 .467 .029 .382 .000 .016 -.001 .010 .904 ..... 
0 
w 
*square root transformation. 
~ 
TablH B-2 
Percentage of Variance Estimates, w2, Related to the Effects 
Of the Analyses of Variance of Ability Judgments 
Partie- Outcome Environmental Motivatiun 
ipant (A) Facility (B) (c) A X B A X C B X C A X B X C Total 
1* .615 .143 .091 .009 .006 -.008 .007 . 781" 
7 .705 .155 .049 .002 -.002 .003 .002 .913 
16 .381 .219 .117 .009 .001 -.010 .002 .729 
25 .440 .169 .257 -.003 -.002 -.002 -.024 .866 
2 .451 .224 .003 .009 .043 .003 -.004 .733 
3* .685 .100 .041 .015 .009 -.028 -.002 .855 
9 .420 .247 .138 .018 .023 -.003 .014 .860 
11 .326 .139 .206 .009 .020 -.003 -.006 .706 
12 .655 . 121 .062 .014 .004 -.003 .008 .864 
13 .514 .334 .030 .042 .005 -.002 -.008 .925 
17 .314 .232 .043 .083 .074 -.002 .024 .770 
24 .484 .237 .107 .066 . 013 -.004 -.004 .807 
26 .431 .156 .040 .060 .016 . 0 0 3 .002 .708 
4 .325 .282 .127 .011 .003 • 012 . 0 3 0 .890 
10 .718 .114 .015 .007 .004 .006 -.009 .864 
15 .517 .217 .089 .017 -.001 -.001 .013 .853 
22 .674 .057 .005 .010 -.002 -.004 .011 .757 
28 .380 .059 .229 .025 .007 .013 -.005 .713 
5 .421 .187 .099 -.003 .030 .004 .012 . 7 53 
14 .584 .086 .104 .010 .017 . 0 0 3 -.023 .801 
18 .604 .261 .052 -.002 .004 .001 .ooo .922 
19 .526 • 0 97 .050 -.011 .054 -.008 -.015 .727 
20 .797 .032 .048 .005 .009 .004 -.006 .895 
23* .464 .285 .106 .010 -.002 .007 -.013 .872 
29 . 67 0 .047 .046 -.021 -.024 -.022 -.068 .763 
8 .289 .362 .139 .009 -.001 -.003 -.036 .799 
6 .731 .102 .086 .011 .007 .007 .007 .951 
21 .679 .049 .083 .016 .038 .006 .007 .878 
27 .631 .137 .134 .008 .001 .000 .011 .922 1-' 
0 
.1:>. 
*square root transformation. 
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